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Developing country governments and international development agencies have
long realized that human, more than physical, capital accumulation is the main-
spring of economic and civil progress. Yet, many children in poor developing
countries fail to complete even the primary education cycle, and some do not
go to school at all. The reasons are well known.1 Baland and Robinson (2000)
demonstrate that child labour will be ine¢ ciently high if parents are credit or be-
quest constrained.2 As one could have expected in the light of a result in Loury
(1981), that parental inability to diversify or insure against the risk of a low
return deters educational investment, Pouliot (2006) shows that uninsurability
causes child labour to be ine¢ ciently high even if credit and bequests are inte-
rior. Similar considerations apply to the risk of a downturn in parental income.
Evidence that parental inability to borrow discourages education, and encour-
ages child labour, is reported by a host of authors, including Jacoby (1994),
Jacoby and Skou￿as (1997), and Fuwa et al. (2009). Evidence that parental
inability to insure against the risk of a low return also discourages education is
reported in Kodde (1986) and Johnson (1987). Evidence in Beegle et al. (2007),
that parents respond to a downturn in their own income by making their chil-
dren work more, suggests that households cannot insure against that kind of
risk. Fitzsimons (2007) reports, however, that parents respond in this way to
a downturn not in their own, but in village aggregate income, suggesting that
idiosyncratic income shocks are neutralized by informal insurance arrangements
at the local level.3 As the government faces less risk than individual households
(because idiosyncratic shocks wash out on average) and, partly thanks to that,
has easier access to international money markets than most of households, the
former can reduce the consequences of credit and insurance market imperfec-
tions by, in e⁄ect, insuring and lending to the latter. But there are two moral
hazard problem.
Only a small part of the work children do in developing countries goes
through the formal labour market.4 Of the rest, a very small (but never small
enough) part involves physically or morally damaging activities. These are the
"worst forms" of child labour, which national governments are committed by in-
ternational treaty to eradicate. But the great bulk of this informal work consists
of activities, like helping in the home, or working in the family farm, conducted
for and under the supervision of the children￿ s own parents. While compara-
tively harmless in themselves, these activities con￿ ict with education, and have
thus an opportunity-cost in terms of forgone future earnings. A moral hazard
problem arises from the fact that the policy maker has statistical information
about the nature and extent of this work, but cannot regulate it directly, be-
1See Cigno and Rosati (2005) for a systematic exposition.
2The latter re￿ects the impossibility of a legally binding contract between parents and
young children. Cigno (2006) shows, however, that a self-enforcing, renegotiation-proof family
constitution serves the same purpose as a contract.
3Evidence of such arrangements in a developing country are reported by, among others,
Besley (1995) and Townsend (1994).
4See Cigno and Rosati (2005).
2cause it does not know who does what. Something similar may be said if we
look at the issue from the educational standpoint. As every parent or teacher
knows, a child￿ s scholastic performance depends not only on total study time
(hours spent attending lessons, plus time spent doing homework), but also on
how alert the child is during that time. In other words, the e⁄ectiveness of any
given amount of time spent studying is a⁄ected positively by the amount of
time the child spends resting, and negatively by the amount of time the child
spends doing physically demanding work. As homework, rest and a good part
of work time are not observable by the government, both the size and the ef-
fectiveness of total study time are then to be regarded as private information.
If unobservables were positively correlated with observables, the government
could stimulate e⁄ective total study time by rewarding school attendance (as in
Mexico￿ s PROGRESA, and other time-buying schemes of the kind), but there
is evidence that the correlation is actually negative. Ravallion and Woodon
(2000) ￿nd that the increase in school attendance elicited by an enrollment
subsidy is four to eight times larger than the corresponding reduction in child
labour. Conversely, Fuwa et al. (2009) estimate that a credit constraint reduces
average school attendance by 60 percent, but raises child labour by double that
percentage.
The other moral hazard problem arises from the fact that the government
does not observe transfers between parents and children, and cannot thus be sure
that a public subsidy intended for the latter will not end up as extra consump-
tion for the former. The present paper sets out to characterize the second-best
policy, and compare the outcome of this policy with two benchmarks, a low one
represented by laissez faire, and a high one represented by the ￿rst best, in a sit-
uation where parents are better informed than the government about their own
children￿ s time allocation, and the government does not observe intra-household
transfers. We take the return to education to be uncertain. Parental income
may be uncertain too, but we will allow for that only informally towards the
end of the paper, because it makes no qualitative di⁄erence to the policy pre-
scription. We assume that parents can neither borrow, nor insure (allowing
for partial, local-level mutual insurance arrangements makes no qualitative dif-
ference to the results). As the implications of an educational externality are
well understood,5 we abstract from it, but will ￿nd that the policy itself gives
rise to a ￿scal externality. As the worst forms of child labour raise moral issues
that transcend the materialistic calculations underlying the present paper,6 we
leave them out of the analysis, but the policies we will propose would discourage
child labour in all its forms. The policy optimization has an optimal taxation (or
principal-agent) format.7 As the focus is on poor developing countries, school
age is taken to mean primary school age.8 Assuming that children in that age
5See, for example, Hanushek et al. (2003).
6But, see Dessy and Pallage (2005) for a strictly economic analysis.
7For a survey of the ways in which optimal taxation, or principal-agent, concepts can be
used in a family policy context, see Cigno (2009).
8For an an analysis focussed on a rich developed country, see, for example, Hanushek et
al. (2003).
3range are under parental control, we take it that the agents are their parents.
Section 2 of the paper lays down the technical assumptions, and characterizes
parental decisions. Section 3 examines the laissez faire equilibrium. Section
4 derives the ￿rst and second best policy. Section 5 discusses the results, and
concludes.
2 Households
There is a large number of households, labelled i = 1;2:::n. Each household
consists of a couple of adults, and one child. Neither the parents, nor the
children, have access to credit and insurance markets. For brevity, we refer to
the child in the ith household as i. There are two periods, labelled t = 1;2.
Children are of school age in period 1, and of working age in period 2. Parents
are alive only in period 1. The income i￿ s parents would produce, in period 1, if
i did not work for them ("parental income") is denoted by yi. We assume that
this income varies across households, but is exogenously given for each of them.
Later in the paper, we will discuss the implications of allowing for this to be a
random variable.
Let ei denote i￿ s e⁄ective total study time. In general, ei will be equal to i￿ s
total study time, multiplied by a productivity factor increasing in i￿ s rest time,
and decreasing in i￿ s work time. To simplify, we will measure ei by the amount
of time that i does not work. Denoting by Li the amount of time i spends
working in the child labour market, the amount of time she spends working for
her parents will then be (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li).9 The former is paid at the child wage
rate, w1. The latter is unpaid, but raises household income by z (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li),
where z (:) is a revenue function, increasing and concave, with z (0) = 0. Let
w2 denote the unskilled adult wage rate. If i does not enroll for school, ei will
be equal to zero. She will then earn w1 in period 1, and w2 in period 2. If she
enrolls for school, by contrast, she will earn Liw1, 0 ￿ Li ￿ 1, in period 1, and
w2 + xi, where xi is the skill premium, in period 2.
While w1 and w2 are certain, xi is not. In Levhari and Weiss (1974) the
uncertainty arises from the fact that a child￿ s learning ability is revealed only
after the educational investment is made. In Razin (1976), it arises from im-
perfect information about the lifetime earning ability of a person with a given
level of education. While learning ability (the rate at which a child accumulates
human capital per unit of e⁄ective total study time) is clearly idiosyncratic,
earning ability conditional on education (the rental price of the human capital
accumulated through education) may depend not only on individual luck, but
also on the state of the economy. As our present focus is on parental decisions,
we will leave the e⁄ects of uncertainty about the future state of the economy for
later discussion, and assume that xi is i.i.d. over the closed interval [0;x] 2 R+,
9Especially if the child is female, this work may consist of replacing her parents (typically
her mother) in the performance of domestic chores, and thus allowing them to spend more
time generating income. If the child is male, it is more likely to involve direct participation
in an income generating activity run by the family.
4with density f (:jei) conditional on ei, and f (:j0) = 0. As xi then re￿ ects only
i￿ s learning ability and e⁄ective total study time, we can use this variable to
measure both i￿ s school result, and i￿ s skill premium.
To capture the fact that the more, and more e⁄ectively, i studies, the better
are her chances of achieving a good result in her school career, and thus of
attracting a high skill premium in the adult labour market, we will assume
that the cumulative distribution of xi, F (xijei), associated with a higher ei,
￿rst-order stochastically dominates the one associated with a lower ei,
Fei (xijei) ￿ 0: (1)
For each ei, there will be values of xi such that (1) holds as an inequality. We





is convex in ei, and equally standard monotone-likelihood-ratio (MLR)
restriction that
fei(xijei)
f(xijei) is increasing in xi.
Ex post, i￿ s utility will be given by
Ui = u(ci1) + u(ci2);
where ci
t denotes i￿ s consumption in period t. By postulating that utility depends
only on consumption, we are implicitly assuming that work a⁄ects utility only
indirectly, via present and future income. This is tenable only because we are
abstracting from the worst forms of child labour. Assuming descending altruism,
the ex-post utility of i￿ s parents will be given by
Vi = v(ai) + ￿Ui; 0 < ￿ < 1;
where ai denotes parental consumption, and the constant ￿ is a measure of
altruism. We further postulate that the functions u(:) and v (:) are increasing
and concave, thus implying risk aversion, and that u0 (0) = v0 (0) = 1, thus
implying that the subsistence level of consumption is normalized to zero.
Let mi denote the parental subsidy, and ￿i the government subsidy, received
by i in period 1. Let ￿i be a tax paid by i in period 2. Each of these transfers
may be positive, negative or zero. Anticipating a result that will obtain in
Section 4, we take ￿i to be independent of Li, and ￿i to be contingent on xi.
Let p denote the price of school enrollment. For the time being, we will take
this to be equal to the average total cost of tuition, but later in the paper we
will consider the possibility of a price subsidy. Parents make their decisions in
period 1, after the government has announced its policy.
If i is not enrolled for school, and assuming, for the time being, that time
allocation and intra-household transfers are not regulated by law, i￿ s parents
will choose (Li;mi) so as to maximize
Vi ￿ v(yi + z (1 ￿ Li) ￿ mi) + ￿ [u(mi + w1Li) + u(w2)];
subject to
Li ￿ 0: (2)
5The ￿rst-order conditions are
￿v0(yi + z (1 ￿ Li) ￿ mi)z0 (1 ￿ Li) + ￿u0 (mi + w1Li)w1 + ￿i = 0 (3)
and
￿v0(yi + z (1 ￿ Li) ￿ mi) + ￿u0 (mi + w1Li) = 0; (4)
where ￿i is the Lagrange-multiplier of (2), equal to zero if the constraint is not
binding.
By contrast, if i is enrolled for school, and again assuming that that time
allocation and intra-household transfers are unregulated, i￿ s parents will choose ￿
ei;Li;mi￿












where vi ￿ v(yi + zi ￿ mi), zi ￿ z (1 ￿ Li ￿ ei), ui1 ￿ u(mi + w1Li + ￿i ￿ p),



















i1 = 0 (7)
3 Laissez faire
In laissez faire, school enrollment is not compulsory, Li is not regulated, and
￿i ￿ ￿
i ￿ 0:
The pay-o⁄ of not enrolling i at school is
￿ (yi) ￿ max
(Li;mi)
V (Li;mi); s.t. (2): (8)
That of enrolling her is





, s.t. (2): (9)
The child will be enrolled if and only if ￿￿ (yi;p) is at least as large as ￿ (yi).
There is a value of yi, e y, implicitly de￿ned by
￿￿ (e y;p) = ￿(e y);
below which i is not enrolled. As e y is the same for every i, because children
are ex-ante identical, if any children do not go to school at all, it will then
6be children whose parents have a low income. This result di⁄ers from the one
in Ranjan (2001), where a child￿ s learning ability is known, and the income
threshold is consequently lower for parents of high-ability, than for parents of
low-ability children.
In view of (3) ￿ (4), if yi is lower than e y, either z0 (1 ￿ Li) = w1 or Li = 0.
Conversely, in view of (6) ￿ (7), if yi is at least as large as e y,
either ￿ z0
i + w1 = 0 or Li = 0: (10)
Suppose that w1 is so low, that Li = 0. If yi is lower than e y, i will then work
full time for her parents. By contrast, if yi is at least as high as e y, i will go to
school, and her e⁄ective study time will be non-decreasing (the amount of work
she does for her parents will be non-increasing) in yi. Alternatively, suppose
that w1 is su¢ ciently high for Li to be positive. If yi is lower than e y, i will
not go to school, and the way she will divide her time between working for her
parents and working for the market will depend only on w1. Otherwise, she will
go to school, and ei will be non-decreasing in yi. But the way she will divide
the rest of her time between working for her parents and working for the market
will again depend only on w1.
As the expected return to education is the same for every i, and assuming
this return to be positive, the e¢ cient level of ei will be positive, and the
same for every i. The laissez-faire level of educational investment, eLF
i , is thus
ine¢ ciently low in every household i where it depends on yi.
Proposition 1. In laissez faire, educational investment is ine¢ ciently
low. In households with parental income below a certain threshold,
children do not enroll for school. Above that threshold, children
enroll for school, and their e⁄ective education time increases with
parental income.
4 Government
If an action is private information, the government must give agents an in-
centive to undertake that action at the socially optimal level. If an action is
common knowledge, by contrast, it does not make sense for the government to
o⁄er costly incentives, because the same result can be costlessly achieved by
threatening agents with a su¢ ciently severe penalty if they do not.10 In our
context, e⁄ective study time, and transfers between parents and children, may
be private information, but school enrollment and the amount of work a child
does in the formal labour market are common knowledge. Having assumed
that the expected return to education is positive for all children, the govern-
ment will then make school enrollment compulsory, and ￿x Li. Depending on
whether (ei;mi) is common knowledge or private information, the government
will either ￿x those variables too, or in￿ uence parental decisions by its choice
10In principal-agent language, this is called a ￿forcing contract￿.
7of (￿i;￿i). Having assumed imperfect credit and insurance markets, equity and
e¢ ciency cannot be separated. Therefore, we formulate the policy optimization
as a welfare maximization problem.






Unlike parents, the government does not face any budget uncertainty, because
parents and children are many, and risks are i.i.d.. Partly for this reason, the
government is also free to borrow or lend in the international credit market.
Making the usual "small country" assumption, we will treat the real interest
rate as a constant, and normalize it to zero. As the optimization can determine
only relative tax rates, we will normalize the one implicit in w2 to zero (and
thus avoid having the account for the revenue). The government then chooses ￿
ei;Li;mi;￿i;￿
i￿














is private information, the maximization will be subject also















, and not also on any
￿
ej;mj;xj;yj￿
, j 6= i.
4.1 First best
In ￿rst best, there are no incentive-compatibility constraints. In addition to
making school enrollment compulsory, the government will then prescribe (ei;Li;mi),
and use personalized lump-sum transfers (￿i;￿i) for each i to re-distribute and
insure. The ￿rst-order conditions for the maximization of (11) subject to(2) and







eidxi = 0; (13)
￿u0
i1 ￿ ￿ = 0 (14)
and, for each possible realization of xi,
￿(￿u0
i2 ￿ ￿)fi = 0; (15)
where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier of the government budget constraint.
We can see from (13) that the marginal opportunity-cost of ei, v0
iz0
i, is
equated to the sum of the expected marginal bene￿t of this investment for
i￿ s parents, ￿
R
xi ui2fi
eidxi, and of the expected marginal bene￿t of a larger tax
revenue for society at large, ￿
R
xi ￿ifi
eidxi. It is thus clear that e⁄ective study
8time is higher in ￿rst best than in laissez faire because, in the latter, parents do
not take account of the ￿scal externality. As all children are ex-ante identical,
(7) and (14) ￿ (15) imply
ai = aFB; ci1 = ci2 = cFB ; ei = eFB and mi = mFB:
Although eFB is greater than eLF
i for every i, there is nothing to say that it will
be equal to unity. Not even an all-seeing, all-powerful government might want
to eliminate child labour altogether.
Proposition 2. In ￿rst best,
(i) all school-age children attend school, and allocate their time be-
tween study and work activities in the same way;
(ii) e⁄ective education time is greater than in laissez faire, but work
time is not necessarily zero;
(iii) the government uses personalized lump-sum taxes and subsidies
to achieve perfect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption
smoothing.
4.2 Second best
In second best, ei and mi are private information. We will refer to Li as overt,
and (1 ￿ ei ￿ Li) as covert child labour. In addition to making school enrollment
compulsory, the government will now ￿x Li, and announce how Li, ￿i and ￿i
are calculated on the basis of the information available at the relevant time. If
it seems odd that a benevolent government would actually oblige children to do
a certain amount of paid work, think of the second-best value of Li as a legal
maximum. Since ￿i is received in period 1, this government subsidy can depend
only on (Li;yi). The same applies also to the legal ceiling on Li. Since ￿i is
payable in period 2, this tax can depend also on xi.
The maximization of (11) is now subject not only to (2) and (12), but
also to the incentive-compatibility constraints on (ei;mi). Denoting by ￿i the
Lagrange-multiplier of (5), and by ￿i that of (7), the ￿rst-order conditions are
now
￿[v0


















i + ￿ (u0
i1 ￿ ￿iu00
i1)w1 + ￿i ￿ (￿iz0
i + ￿i)v00
i z0
i = 0; (17)
￿v0
i + ￿u0




i = 0; (18)
￿ (u0
i1 ￿ ￿iu00
i1) ￿ ￿ = 0 (19)







i2 + ￿fi = 0: (20)
9Let us start by characterizing the second-best policy schedules. Using (7),we
can re-write (19) as











is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Given that v0
i is decreasing,
and assuming that ri is non-increasing in yi,11 we can then write
￿i = ￿ (yi); (21)














i2 is increasing in ￿i, and having assumed that
fei
fi is increasing in xi, we
can then write
￿i = ￿(xi); (22)
where ￿(:) is an increasing function.
Having established that ￿ (:) is a decreasing function, and ￿(:) an increasing
one, it is clear that the policy redistributes from the rich to the poor, and
provides insurance for all, as in ￿rst best. Comparing (19) with (14), and (20)
with (15), however, it is also clear that the policy does not go as far as in ￿rst
best. As it cannot use personalized lump-sum transfers, the government must
in fact limit its recourse to distortionary policy instruments. As there is nothing
to prevent ￿i from falling below zero for yi su¢ ciently small, we can interpret
this period-1 transfer as the di⁄erence between a ￿ at-rate education grant, and
a tax on parental income. Similarly, as there is nothing to stop ￿i being negative
for xi su¢ ciently small, we can interpret this period-2 transfer as the di⁄erence
between a tax on the individual skill premium, and a scholarship increasing in
the individual school result. Stepping outside the formal model for a moment,
we can think of the scholarship as being paid "at the beginning" of period 2,
when the ￿nal school result is revealed,12, and of the tax as being collected "in
the course" of that period as the skill premium gradually unfolds.
We now go on characterize the second-best Li. Condition (17) may be re-
written as
either ￿ z0
i + w1 = ￿iz00
i ￿ [￿iw1 + (￿i + ￿iz0
i)z0
i]ri or Li = 0: (23)
The LHS of the ￿rst equation in (23) is the same as in (10), but the RHS is
a negative number, increasing in yi, rather than zero as in the latter. If w1
11Evidence of diminishing absolute risk aversion in an educational context is reported by
Kodde (1986) among others.
12If partial school results are available in the course of period 1, the child could receive
advances in the course, and the balance at the end, of that period.
10is large enough for Li to be interior, the marginal product of i￿ s covert child
labour will then be higher than the child wage rate, and this type of labour
will be decreasing in yi. To see what happens to covert child labour when overt
child labour is constrained to zero, we must look at what happens to e⁄ective
study time.



















i1 = 0: (25)
Having found that period-1 redistribution stops short of full consumption equal-
ization, it is clear from (24)￿(25) that e⁄ective study time and parental transfers
are not equalized across households. All these conditions say is then that chil-
dren from poor households study and consume less than children from rich ones.
But we can go a little further using the incentive-compatibility constraints.
Given the policy, (ei;mi) is determined by (5) ￿ (7). Taking total di⁄eren-



































the expected marginal utility of i￿ s e⁄ective education time, decreasing in ei. It
is clear from (26)￿(27) that, if ￿i is positive, i￿ s parents will appropriate part of
this subsidy, but will allow i to work less than he otherwise would. Conversely,
if ￿i is negative, i￿ s parents will partially compensate i for this tax, but will
make him work more.
On the one hand, as ￿ (:) is a decreasing function, the policy then encour-
ages educational investment in poor households, and discourages it in rich ones,
because it relaxes the credit constraint in the former and tightens it in the lat-
ter. On the other hand, however, as ￿(:) is increasing, the policy encourages
educational investments in all households, because it makes this form of invest-
ment less risky for everybody. Therefore, the policy is likely to encourage all
households except possibly the richest to invest in their children￿ s education.
This makes sense of the rule on overt child labour. In order to limit its recourse
to distortionary taxation, the government must allow children from poor house-
holds to produce a certain amount of income. If w1 is high enough to make
waged work worthwhile, the government will then impose a positive ceiling on
11the amount of paid work children do, and make this maximum a decreasing
function of parental income. If w1 is very low, by contrast, there is no point
in imposing a ceiling on overt child labour, because covert child labour is more
productive. As covert child labour cannot be regulated by law, however, the
government will then lose a policy instrument. Other things being equal, a
high child wage rate is better than a low one, not only because it expands the
household budget set, but also because it brings more child labour out into the
open.
Proposition 3. In second best,
(i) all school-age children attend school;
(ii) e⁄ective education time is higher than in laissez faire for most
children;
(ii) the government uses a combination of taxes, education grants,
obligations and prohibitions to redistribute and insure, but stops short
of perfect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption smoothing.
4.3 Extensions
Would there be any point in the government subsidizing school enrollment, or
taxing overt child labour? If ￿ (:) and ￿(:) are in place, the answer is clearly
no. The answer may change, however, if ￿ (:) is not available. In the absence
of any form of subsidization, and given credit rationing, making primary school
enrollment compulsory would in fact make the poorest households (those with
parental income lower than e y) worse-o⁄ than in laissez faire. An enrollment
subsidy would obviously raise welfare if it were ￿nanced by foreign donors. It
would raise welfare also it it were ￿nanced by a tax on parental income, but
would not be as good as our ￿ (:), because a price subsidy cannot be equal to
more than a hundred per cent of the price, and that might not be enough. An
enrollment subsidy ￿nanced by a poll tax would have no e⁄ect, because parents
would then take a lump-sum subsidy with one hand, and pay a lump-sum tax of
the same amount with the other. If ￿(:) is not in place, an enrollment subsidy,
however ￿nanced, will not be su¢ cient for a second best, and could actually
reduce welfare, because it encourages school attendance at the expense of rest
and homework. A tax on overt child labour would lower welfare in any case,
because it would drive some of this labour underground.
In the analysis so far, we have assumed that parental incomes are certain,
and individual skill premia subject only to idiosyncratic shocks. What di⁄erence
would it make if not only xi, but also yi, were a random variable, and both were
subject to aggregate, as well as idiosyncratic shocks? If xi re￿ ects the state
of the economy when i enters the adult labour market, and that state is not
known with certainty when ei is chosen, the government must use its ability
to borrow and lend for redistributing not only within, but also across cohorts.
Formally, therefore, the government￿ s time horizon must be extended from two
to an in￿nite number of periods. That done, however, the policy schedules will
12remain qualitatively the same as if the optimization concerned only two periods.
The same applies if yi also is a random variable, because ￿ (:) will then serve the
purpose of insuring parents against the risk of a downturn in their own income,
as well as that of redistributing among them.
5 Conclusion
Given ￿nancial market imperfection, the laissez-faire level of e⁄ective education
time is ine¢ ciently low. In households where parental income lies below a certain
threshold, children do not even enroll for school. As already established in the
theoretical literature, and con￿rmed by the empirical one, the reason is not only
that parents cannot borrow against the expected return to their educational
investments, but also that they cannot insure against the risk of this return
being low.
In ￿rst best, all children study at the e¢ cient level, the same for all of them.
But there is nothing to indicate that the e¢ cient level of work time is zero. The
government makes school enrollment compulsory, and uses personalized lump-
sum transfers to achieve perfect equity, full insurance, and perfect consumption-
smoothing. In second best, all children attend school, but e⁄ective study time
is ine¢ ciently low. The government makes school enrollment compulsory, and
uses a combination of taxes on parental incomes and the children￿ s skill premia,
together with a mix of merit and need based education awards. If the child wage
rate is su¢ ciently high, it also imposes a legal ceiling, decreasing in parental
income, on overt child labour. This policy redistributes and insures, and relaxes
the credit constraint, but does not go far enough to achieve perfect equity, full
insurance, and perfect consumption-smoothing.
In reality, primary school enrollment is o¢ cially compulsory, and labour at
a very young age o¢ cially forbidden, in most countries. In poor developing
ones, however, education is subsidized, if at all, only through the price of school
enrollment. As we have shown, enforcing school enrollment, or making the ban
on child labour e⁄ective, without o⁄ering parents any kind of subsidy, in a
situation where they can neither borrow nor buy insurance, would push social
welfare below the laissez-faire level. An enrollment subsidy ￿nanced by a tax
on parental income, or by foreign donations, might be better than nothing, but
not enough for a second best.
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